IRE
Returning to IRESS (we wrote a short note on the day of the result) worth noting that whilst mgmt called out an “earnings upgrade”, given they maintained guidance (full year adjusted EBITDA of $127m-$135m) whilst selling an asset, meaning the base business lifted, it remains the case that FCF generation was quite poor.
Whilst it seems that there’s a decent sized “stranded cost” improvement program to come, which would drive earnings, the outlook for sales and margin expansion were fairly modest, with FY27/28 held out as an expected time to see improved momentum.
So, at 22/23x earnings, it wouldn’t be that compelling. Still, there’s the prospect of M&A, and by all accounts an interested party at $10.50 or so.
On balance I could understand maintaining a position.
SGH
The owner of Boral, Coates and Westrac (plus equity interests in Beach and Seven West Media) tabled okay results. Top line growth was essentially flat, and the earnings improvement coming from cost and productivity initiatives.

The heroic story of the past few years has been doubling the margins in Boral, under Vik Bansal, who now transitions to a member of the SGH board.
Whilst the earnings have grown in recent years, most of the share price movement has been explained by the higher PE multiple (multiple expansion). Despite yesterday’s sell-off, it’s still pretty expensive, for a cyclical industrial. If you put it under the banner of “founder-led business with strong track record” as an appealing thematic, you could justify holding a position, noting that the guidance for “low-to-mid-single digit EBIT growth” will trigger modest negative eps revisions.
The economy seems to be holding up, and whilst some things are weaker (like roads, which impacts asphalt/concrete/aggregates etc) other parts within engineering, construction, and possibly residential (where approvals are up) are doing better, and if you are a growth oriented investor with a long time horizon, it’s probably fine.
CBA
With CBA it is just weird to see a giant levered entity trading at 29x forward earnings when pre-provision profits are growing at 3%. It’s a perfectly credible result, but there’s no getting around that juxtaposition, in our view.

4.85 (the div) divided by ~$180 is not a big number, frankly, regardless of franking.
TWE
Treasury Wine seems to have become the stock where every earnings update there’s something to fret about, whether it’s COVID, getting locked out of China (Australian trade war), tariffs (recent US trade war) and now the potential slowdown in Penfolds China as large format banquet style events are frowned upon. We can add the California distributor replacement issue to that long list as well.
And yet, overall the financials seem to grind higher. Most of the metrics below are pretty good, and the stock trades on 13x forward earnings.

Penfolds is most of the value, & the low/double digit growth forecast for FY26, & 15% for FY27 seems to be viewed very skeptically by the market.
The China demand story, at least according to management, is still very strong, outside of this particular banquet-related slice of the market, and Asia in general remains very strong. So whilst it’s a negative, it’s not the whole story.
Similarly, the replacement of RNDC with a new distributor is a negative, but not a permanent one, and doesn’t seem to quite explain the share price de-rating of the past year. However, again, given the shift away from drinking (by youth demographics mainly) and the increased amount of choice out there, combining the above issues seems to explain the generally sceptical market view towards the (fairly material) guided growth rate of EBITS over the next few years.
But stocks that trade on 12x-13x don’t tend to have growth rates anywhere near that. So I guess our summary is something like “despite lots of negatives, TWE have managed to grow earnings…

…cashflows…

…margins…

and returns over time.

They are still guiding to quite a bit of growth, but the market doesn’t believe it, and isn’t pricing it in. On the assumption they grind out some growth, the shares look mispriced”. Gearing’s okay at 2x ND/EBITDA, and the $200m buyback declared reflects the board’s view that the shares are “materially undervalued”.
IAG
IAG reported a fairly clean result across the board, with almost all major metrics moving in the right direction.

Retention rates are very high, in the 90s for Australia and mid 90s for NZ, across home and motor, in direct retail. Net promoter scores are high, and customer numbers are increasing.
Whilst claims are benign and costs well managed…

…the big kicker remains the higher interest rate environment, with another $423m added from income from technical reserves and shareholder funds.

The forecast is for moderating GWP growth (low-mid-single-digit) and for an insurance margin of between 14-16%. Importantly, it’s not predicated on any material reserve releases, and the overall income forecast isn’t including the RACQ acquired businesses.
So growth should be robust, overall, and quite profitable, if it executes as planned.
AGL
I don’t think we could call AGL’s result a “good one”. Underlying EBITDA at the mid-point of the guided range there is $2.070bn, a little under the market’s FY26 expectation of $2.11bn. Not too dramatic, but still, a miss at EBITDA, and FY25 NPAT of $640m was also a miss relative to $670m expected, with consumer and integrated energy markets both a bit weaker than expected.

However the main issue is the underlying NPAT guide, where the market (and ourselves) were surprised by the extent that the D&A charge (and other moving parts beneath EBITDA) have on profit. We can see where it’s coming from, in that AGL are spending a lot of money to build out batteries, and to maintain the coal and gas assets, but until those batteries are built, you face the net impact of an earnings drag without a revenue uplift.

Poor fleet availability (due to unplanned outages) and energy market margin weakness, meant that cashflows in 2025 were some of the weakest we’ve seen in some time, running at a bit over $400m in the 1H and a bit under for the 2H, which is a lot lower than in prior years. Management are being conscious of this weaker run of cashflows, by making sure the dividend is sized appropriately, but the net impact is that earnings, cashflows and dividends disappointed both in the half just gone and in the year to come, hence the -12% share price drop today.
There were some positives, things like customer churn remain superior for AGL relative to market, safety rates improved, and net customers grew (although mainly from Netflix and teleco’s, rather than energy).
The customer margin is expected to improve, as is energy availability, but all that is already factored into the EBITDA guidance.
The main bit of good news is two fold; one, over time, energy demand will grow, driven by EVs, airconditioning, data centers and the like. Two, whilst I am a fan of hydrocarbons, batteries are the main solution to storage issues, and it appears that AGL are getting good traction with their battery assets, seeing returns tracking at the higher end of what they expected.

They’ve got 300MW up and running, there’s another 900 to come under construction (which is what’s eating all the free cashflow) and there’ll be plenty more over the coming years.
AGL is one of the few stocks that does benefit when there’s dislocations in the market, and so to a degree, AGL is best thought of as something of a portfolio hedge, a bit similar to what we saw in 2022 with the RUS-UKR war, and other periodic energy market outages.
Important Information: This document has been prepared by Aequitas Investment Partners Pty Ltd ABN 92 644 165 266 (“Aequitas”, “our”, “we”), a Corporate Authorised Representative (no. 1284389) of AIP FS Pty Ltd ABN 49 680 982 478 (Australian Financial Services Licensee no. 700016) and is for distribution within Australia to wholesale clients only.
This document is based on information available at the time of publishing, information which we believe is correct and any opinions, conclusions or forecasts are reasonably held or made as at the time of its compilation, but no warranty is made as to its accuracy, reliability or completeness. To the extent permitted by law, neither Aequitas nor any of its affiliates accept liability to any person for loss or damage arising from the use of the information herein.
Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance.
General Advice Warning: This document has been prepared without taking into account your objectives, financial situation or needs, and therefore you should consider its appropriateness, having regard to your objectives, financial situation and needs. Before making any decision about whether to acquire a financial product, you should obtain and read the relevant Product Disclosure Statement (PDS) or Investor Directed Portfolio Service Guide (IDPS Guide) and consider talking to a financial adviser.
Taxation warning: Aequitas is not authorised to provide tax (financial) advice and is not a registered tax agent. Investors should seek their own tax advice from a registered tax agent or a registered tax (financial) adviser if they intend to rely on this information to satisfy the liabilities or obligations or claim entitlements that arise, or could arise, under a taxation law. We recommend that you consult a registered tax agent or a tax specialist to confirm your taxation position.